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Europe’s most vulnerable regions, characterised by 
persistent low growth and poverty, face a systemic 
lack of specific EU support.1 These regions display 
particularly high levels of vulnerability to the social, 
economic and territorial impacts of COVID-19, which 
will affect their recovery trajectories. They risk being  
left further behind in the EU’s complex pathway  
towards ‘a green and digital recovery’.2
The Union’s lack of focus and action for investing in 
these most vulnerable regions must be addressed. First 
and foremost, EU institutions and member states should 
recognise that some territories will struggle much more 
than others in their recovery trajectories. Ignoring 
their plight would have potentially far-reaching 
consequences. The EU’s ‘convergence machine’ could be 
damaged irreparably, with long-term – and potentially 
political – consequences.
We call for a specific EU initiative to support the Union’s 
low-growth, poor regions, underpinned by the existing 
policy architecture. In particular, we recommend:
•  creating an EU policy space for regions experiencing 
long-term low growth and poverty, to promote the 
value and visibility of place-based support;
•  aligning Cohesion Policy (CP) and the Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (RRF) for improved policy 
coherence and greater investment impact; and
•  tailoring support for growth-enhancing reforms in  
the EU’s most vulnerable regions. 
 
BACKGROUND: LOW GROWTH, COVID-19  
AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES 
Achieving a COVID-19 recovery that is underpinned by 
the twin digital and sustainable transitions is difficult 
for all territories across the EU. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
echoes this challenge, noting that recovery will not 
follow a “straight or linear course of policy action”4 
and should be underpinned by effective multilevel 
governance. Delivering successful twin transitions in 
places characterised by significant disadvantage will be 
especially difficult. Their challenges include a long-term 
absence of reform to address pre-existing high levels of 
deprivation and low-income distribution.
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Delivering successful green and digital 
transitions in places characterised by 
significant disadvantage will be  
especially difficult.
 
These regions face an uphill struggle to address the social, 
health and economic impacts of the pandemic. Long-term 
reform deficits (especially in governance and administrative 
capacity) are also preventing a swift and decisive move 
away from the ‘firefighting’ phase of responding to the 
fallout from the crisis. Failing to ensure a sustainable 
recovery across all EU territories will exacerbate existing 
disparities and impede green and digital transitions. 
Addressing underlying challenges of social, economic 
and territorial cohesion must be prioritised in the green 
recovery roadmap of the EU’s most vulnerable places.
Since 2000, many regions that are poorer than the EU 
average also have the worst growth performance. These 
vulnerable areas, where national and EU divergence is 
taking place, are strongly concentrated in Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain.5 In particular, most regions in Italy 
and Greece have experienced less than half the Union’s 
average GDP growth (see Figure 1, page 1). Although low 
growth also exists in other EU territories (and might well 
have deteriorated with the pandemic), this Policy Brief 
focuses on the regions of these four countries because  
of the complex, concentrated and long-term nature of 
their challenges.
Spotlight on the complexity of the recovery challenge for low-
growth regions
Not all regions with poor growth performance face 
identical problems. They are subject, however, to similar 
characteristics that perpetuate entrenched, path-
dependent outcomes and can limit options to transform 
social and economic realities. For example, long-term 
industrial decline and distance to economic opportunity 
can weaken business and innovation systems as well as 
industrial investment.  
In turn, costly upgrades to social and health systems 
become difficult to finance and lead to long-term 
postponements of critical reforms (in e.g. pension 
systems, social safety nets and legal structures). 
Nation-wide reforms can become bogged down in local 
bureaucracy and are often ill-conceived to support 
smooth, local implementation. Critically, capacity for 
effective public administration and governance (within 
the region and connected to national and EU levels) 
can become significantly reduced over time. The EU’s 
fragmentation and inequality challenges – manifested in 
areas like digital and innovation divides, limited capacity 
for energy transition and high concentrations of people 
with low skills and/or pay – are usually associated with its 
low-growth, poor regions. 
Correspondingly, job losses and disruptions caused 
by the COVID-19 crisis and negative labour market 
impacts related to the twin transitions are likely to be 
felt more acutely in the EU’s poor, low-growth regions.6 
The consequential structural changes will be difficult to 
manage in these regions due to a lack of local capacity 
and appetite to respond with the right mix of reforms. 
While the EU is experiencing a new groundswell of 
demand to address reforms (spurred by the RRF’s 
investment capacity and drive to steer twin transition 
imperatives towards recovery), the momentum and 
ability to embrace them is far from assured in the most 
vulnerable, low-growth regions.
Pre-existing vulnerabilities complicate these regions’ 
COVID-19 recovery on two levels. First, their real-time 
crisis responses are weakened by poor institutional 
infrastructures. Second, planning for a green recovery 
is challenged by a context of limited endowments from 
which to ‘rebuild’, as well as a weak capacity for reform. 
By way of example, the prevalence of digital deficits (both 
infrastructural and skills-related) in the Union’s poor and 
low-growth regions impedes their capacity for remote 
working. Recent OECD data reveals the state of the EU’s 
digital divide: low-growth regions have the least possibility 
for remote working in their respective countries.7 
The RRF’s first disbursements must be complemented with 
design and implementation reform support across the EU’s 
poor and low-growth regions. Failure to do so risks further 
entrenching and widening pre-existing inequalities. 
 
STATE OF PLAY: EU SUPPORT FOR THE 
COMPLEX PATHWAY TO RECOVERY IN THE 
MOST VULNERABLE REGIONS
Place-based policy: Past efforts had limited success
In 2015, the European Commission set up the Lagging 
Regions Initiative to respond to the development challenge 
of the EU’s less developed regions. It had marginal success 
in transforming the fortunes of the lowest-growth regions, 
partly due to a limited acknowledgement of the problem of 
low growth and a corresponding failure to target tailored 
support to these regions.8 Despite recent attempts to revive 
EU policymakers’ appetite to champion ‘place-sensitive 
policymaking’,9 the plight of the EU’s poor and low-growth 
regions has remained largely under the radar of EU policy.
The Recovery and Resilience Facility: Good potential with 
some caveats
The RRF has a built-in redistributive dimension which 
should benefit countries that face low growth. It also 
has an explicit objective of cohesion: the Commission is 
required to verify that resources are not concentrated in 
more advantaged areas.
Despite its good intentions, the RRF has a strong ‘top-
down’ orientation, with centralisation at the national 
level. This has provoked widespread criticism that 
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national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) are subject 
to a design that overlooks how territories within the same 
country need tailored solutions to address their different 
investment and reform needs. Furthermore, the RRPs’ 
tight planning and design timeline has not allowed for 
extensive evidence-gathering at local levels, nor has 
it been conducive to engendering effective multilevel 
governance planning and coordination. 
The risks of poor local investment targeting, linked to 
the RRF architecture, are particularly high in poor and 
low-growth regions. With the greatest ‘distance’ to cover 
to achieve a green recovery, these territories could be 
negatively impacted by a top-down intervention logic 
that fails to acknowledge or meet their reform and 
investment needs. This oversight could undermine the 
RRF’s redistributive function.
Clearly, there are no quick wins or silver bullets for any EU 
territory to achieve a green recovery. Significant, broad-
brush investments in digital infrastructures, for example, 
will not – in isolation – deliver a digital transition. 
Demand-side measures like strengthening purchasing 
power, interoperability and skills must work in tandem 
with supply-side investments. Given their multiple 
challenges and deficits, the EU’s poor, low-growth regions 
need a tailored ‘package’ of reforms and support.
A revived role for Cohesion Policy 
There is growing concern that the accelerated push 
at EU and national levels to get RRPs approved and 
mobilise RRF finances risks a default investment focus 
on ‘shovel-ready’ projects, which would normally be 
reserved for CP investments. Commissioner Elisa Ferreira 
recently insisted that national RRPs and CP resources are 
implemented in a “strategic and complementary” way 
via parallel programming, which is sensitive to territorial 
needs and avoids double funding.10 However, some 
member states (including those of the most vulnerable 
regions) face significant capacity constraints to achieve 
this. This could be very detrimental to the effectiveness of 
CP investments in low growth regions.
The need for tailored investment and reform support 
presents a new and important opportunity for CP to 
demonstrate its added value. CP investments can 
complement the RRF’s broad-brush investment direction, 
especially in the Union’s most vulnerable places, by 
reinforcing and targeting specific reforms and actions. For 
example, RRF-focused energy transition funding can be 
significantly boosted by regional CP investments to 
increase job opportunities, retraining programmes and 
citizen-led capacity building support. Such efforts would 
help workers and local communities in adapting to the 
green transition. Cohesion investments can carve out 
place-based pathways towards structural transformation 
via a strongly connected investment approach across  
CP and the RRF, further reinforcing the strategic value  
of the latter. 
 
PROSPECTS: A NEW EU INITIATIVE FOR THE 
MOST VULNERABLE REGIONS
The RRF’s investment capacity, coupled with the 2021-27 
CP, has ignited widespread national enthusiasm for 
reforms, which was virtually impossible to mobilise in the 
past. Prior to the RRF, the annual performance of national 
reform implementation, as requested in the European 
Semester’s Country-Specific Recommendations, was 
underwhelming, owing to the various ‘costs’ involved.11 
EU territories have different ‘starting points’ when 
embarking on the path to a green recovery. Poor and 
low-growth regions have the most ground to cover and 
the least capacity to focus on reforms while responding to 
the immediate needs of the crisis. Reform pathways take 
time, are costly and require citizen acceptance which can 
be difficult to engender. Strong and consistent local 
political leadership that ‘keeps the pace’ with reform 
implementation will be critical.  
 
Poor and low-growth regions have the 
least capacity to focus on reforms while 
responding to the immediate needs of  
the COVID-19 crisis.
 
The European Commission should create a specific EU 
initiative under Commissioner Ferreira’s responsibility 
to support the Union’s most vulnerable regions with 
dedicated actions and investment for a green recovery. 
The initiative’s underpinning architecture and investment 
are already present in the RRF, CP and Technical Support 
Instrument (TSI). The specific recommendations below 
outline how to improve the process, direction and 
implementation of these existing instruments.
RECOMMENDATION 1:  CREATE AN EU-LEVEL POLICY 
SPACE FOR LOW-GROWTH REGIONS
Previous EU policy failed to acknowledge the challenges 
of the Union’s most vulnerable territories and the urgency 
to address their long-term poverty and low growth. 
There is now a new momentum for place-based 
policymaking, which the European Commission should 
exploit through the following elements:
•  Acknowledge the value of specific, multilevel 
support for vulnerable territories in new and 
existing policy instruments. This could be done via an 
appropriate analysis of low-growth patterns in the 8th 
Cohesion Report; a revival of the European Semester’s 
Annex D12 (focusing on disparities and inequalities)  
and connecting this to the ongoing monitoring of the 
RRF; and positive engagement with the Conference  
on the Future of Europe to highlight local needs to  
EU institutions.
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•  Develop a territorial evidence base which details 
the implementation and impact of reforms across all 
EU territories by tracking continuously the evolution 
of both national and regional interventions and 
investments. This repository of evidence, knowledge 
and learning opportunities would also incentivise 
and boost momentum for, and ownership of, growth-
enhancing reforms. 
RECOMMENDATION 2:  TAILOR SUPPORT TO THE 
EU’S MOST VULNERABLE REGIONS
There is a strong case to be made for a ‘bottom-up’ reform 
support orientation, managed by DG REFORM via the 
TSI and currently available on a voluntary basis to all 
member states. Tailoring support to address local (and 
multifaceted) needs requires a package of measures, 
specifically (and holistically) designed to address the 
challenges of the EU’s most vulnerable territories. An 
inclusive approach that encompasses the following 
elements would help to generate long-term local 
ownership of the reform agenda:
•  Improve EU regions’ connection to the TSI by 
encouraging member states’ requests to account for 
the needs of their territories, and engaging in dialogue 
between member states, regions and DG REFORM.
•  Incentivise and build capacity for a green and 
digital recovery. This involves increasing support 
for improved governance and administrative capacity 
(e.g. strengthening local leadership skills and 
resources) and improving financial management and 
investment capacity for sustainable financing.
•  Promote opportunities for joint action to 
enhance reform cooperation and coherence 
across EU territories. By sharing their challenges 
and experiences of reform, the EU’s most vulnerable 
regions can benefit from external insights and 
practices. There are lessons to be learned from the Just 
Transition Platform,13 which is generating high levels 
of cooperation, acceptance and momentum across the 
regions targeted for energy transition support. 
RECOMMENDATION 3:  ALIGN COHESION POLICY 
AND THE RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE FACILITY 
As mentioned, there are opportunities for CP and the 
RRF to be complementary in their support and funding. 
If planned and implemented well, there is scope for 
greater impact and value than if kept separately. However, 
the current EU debate on this topic is split between 
the sceptics and champions of CP. History tells us that 
‘digging in’ to retracted positions is unlikely to create a 
new momentum or enthusiasm for CP. To achieve this 
objective, two measures are key:
•  Develop and strengthen the relationship between 
CP and the RRF and move away from a conflictual 
narrative. This can be achieved by identifying their 
synergies and complementarities while promoting 
CP’s structural transformation role.
•  DG REFORM should lead efforts to facilitate, 
design and implement a strong alignment between 
reform and investment targets through the national 
RRPs and regional CP funds. This would help promote 
the case for the two instruments working in tandem.
The EU’s green and digital recovery strategy fails to 
account for the specific needs of its poor and low-growth 
regions. Existing disparities and fragmentation challenges 
across the Union could widen or even become entrenched, 
casting new doubts on the EU’s ability and commitment 
to strengthen its convergence agenda. The fallout could 
lead to a rise in territorial and political tensions while 
leaving many vulnerable places behind. This Policy Brief 
outlines an agenda for a new EU initiative that champions 
reform support for these vulnerable territories and 
improves their prospects for a digital and green recovery.
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